SUBJECT TERMS
In the late 1960s, faced with a rapidly changing balance in the global power structure, the Communist leadership in the People's Republic of China was forced to re-evaluate the threat to national security. The changing world scene created new vulnerabilities for China which had to be dealt with successfully if China was to survive. The leadership, including the venerable Chou En Lai, sought ways to avoid the apparent dangers of the future, hopefully without abandoning the ideological underpinnings of the revolution. After the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution and the "Great Leap Forward" the domestic political situation was delicate, at best. The already weak economy was deteriorating while the internal ideological debates continued to flare up, impeding recovery. The People's Army was also drawn into the turmoil; heavily politicized and greatly weakened in the process. It fell to Chou En Lai, the most pragmatic of the Chinese "Old Guard", to deal with a serious threat to continued national development and, arguably, the existence of the regime in China.
The Threat
In the eyes of the national leadership the primary threat stemmed from A secondary threat seemed also to be emerging from the growing economic power of Japan and the apparent retreat of the United States, specifically from Indochina and generally from Asia. These trends signaled to China the emergence of a new four power pattern of relationships, a pattern which threatened China but one which could also be exploited to China's advantage. To do so Chou En Lai turned to the West.
Chou was an adherent of Maoist tactical and strategic doctrine, as proclaimed in policy documents first produced in the mid-1940s, which called for "flexible" associations with other powers to create a counterweight in the face of the primary enemy. As each primary enemy was defeated China could turn to the next enemy (even its erstwhile associates) and defeat them in turn. This doctrine permitted the Chinese communists to coordinate with the U.S. and Nationalists during the war in the face of the primary threat from Japan and it would be used by Chou to justify a reopening with the U.S. to balance the Soviet threat. This was balance of power politics at its best!
China's National Interest
Chou's interest in this situation was straightforward; preservation of the 
Tactics for Success
Chou used exemplary diplomatic negotiation to achieve his goal. Chou was not so simple to think that good fellowship, a state banquet or two and commonality of interest were sufficient to bind up the wounds of over twenty years. His personal attention to the details of the relationship, especially with Kissinger, made straight the way for success. He used subtle signs to remind Kissinger of his domestic political vulnerability, hopefully convincing the U.S. of the need to be forthcoming and he used his considerable personal charm to win over the hardest of hearts on the U.S. delegations.
Measures of Success
The success of the Chinese policy can best be measured by the Soviet reaction. After it became clear that China had succeeded in re-establishing relations with the West, the USSR immediately sought to improve its own relations with the U.S. to convince Washington that it, too, was a responsible negotiating partner in dealing with global issues of mutual interest. Pressure on the border eased almost immediately as the Soviets faced a new correlation of forces in Asia.
The successful inclusion of an understanding recognizing Taiwan as an integral part of China was another triumph for the Chinese. The nascent movement towards adoption of a "two China" policy in the U.S. was stopped. Finally, China's entry into the U.N. and its recognition by Japan opened new doors for the economic development needed to bolster her domestic power base and strengthen her ability to resist coercive outside influence in the future. All of this was achieved without fundamental cost to the national leadership. In fact, it can be argued that the success of the policy pursued by Chou led to the adoption of more moderate domestic policies as well. The normalization of relations with the west signaled the failure of ideological extremism in domestic policy. The resultant period of domestic growth and prosperity led to the downfall of the "Gang of Four" and the movement, however slow and tentative, towards a more open society.
All of this was accomplished because of the careful, rational analysis of China's fundamental interests in the world and an equally rational pursuit of those interests by a brilliant leader. Chou En Lai correctly identified the threat posed by the Soviet Union. He identified a means to counter the threat and proceeded to obtain and apply that tool in a methodical and effective manner. The fact that the relations just that much easier to achieve. This was a classic case of pragmatic considerations overcoming strong but irrelevant (in this context) ideological differences to achieve an understanding of mutual convenience. It served both parties well and created a reliable relationship where none had previously existed.
As Kissinger put it, "Reliability is the cement of international order." With the successful rapprochement with the U.S., China, led by Chou En Lai, was able to use the cement of a more reliable relationship with the U.S. to reinforce the foundations of her own policy in dealing with the Soviet Union and the rapidly changing international order.
